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I.

INTRODUCTION

Even in the brass-knuckle world of Illinois politics,
the fittest need to abide by just a few simple rules to
thrive.
Rule No. 1: Never pick up the phone to squeeze
campaign money from a company that has public
contracts.
Rule No. 2: Always delegate the money-collecting
dirty work to a flunky.
Rule No. 3: Glare, seethe, or stare daggers if you
must, but never utter a syllable that could be construed
as a threat and captured by a hidden recording device.1
The creation of an apolitical public service has been a goal of
government in the United States almost since the nation's
inception.2 As the above quote illustrates, however, achieving this
1. Bob Secter & Rick Pearson, Santos Bungled Art of Fundraising,Experts
Say, CHI.TRIB., May 5, 1999, § 2, at 1.
2. In 1801, for example, Thomas Jefferson issued an executive order
advocating the political neutrality of public employees. Senator Rives stated:
The President of the United States has seen with dissatisfaction
officers of the General Government taking on various occasions active parts
in elections of the public functionaries, whether of the General or of the
State Governments ....The right of any officer to give his vote at elections
as a qualified citizen is not meant to be restrained, nor, however given,
shall it have any effect to his prejudice; but it is expected that he will not
attempt to influence the votes of others nor take any part in the business of
electioneering, that being deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the
Constitution and his duties to it.
W.C. RIvEs, A SPEECH TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE ON A BILL TO PREVENT THE
INTERFERENCE OF CERTAIN FEDERAL OFFICERS IN ELECTIONS, CONG. GLOBE, 25th
Cong., 3d Sess. 407 (1839), reprintedin 8 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESmENTS, 1789-1897, at 98 (1898)
[hereinafter RICHARDSON]. See also Henry Rose, A CriticalLook at the Hatch Act, 75
HARV. L. REV. 510, 510 (1962) (describing the early development of federal
restrictions on the political activities of public employees and noting that legislation
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ideal might be difficult given the practical realities of politics. On
the one hand, the dangers associated with allowing politics to
interfere in the delivery of public services have been clearly
recognized.3 On the other hand, there exists an "untold"
realization that participation in party politics, and even in public
service, must sometimes be rewarded, and that the dispensation
of political favors is one way of doing so.4
Generally, government has taken two approaches to regulate
the political involvement of public employees. One approach has
been to enact laws restricting the ability of public employees to
engage in various political activities (e.g., campaign, solicit
contributions, or run for political office).5 This is exemplified at
the federal level by the Hatch Act,6 though similar regulations
exist at the state level.7 The second approach involves regulating
political involvement via the power of public employers to hire
and fire based on an employee's political preferences, i.e.,
patronage. 8
Over the years, both methods of political control have been
challenged in the courts as infringing upon the constitutional rights
of public employees.9 In evaluating their constitutionality, the
courts have adopted contrasting positions. Generally, courts have

began as early as 1907 with the passage of Civil Service Rule I).
3. See John B. Webster & Jeffrey W. Kasle, The Hatch Act: Should It Be
Repealed or Reformed?, GOV'T UNION REV., Winter 1998, at 25, 27-28 (restrictions on
the political activities of public employees have been advanced as necessary to
eliminate the "spoils" system, to end political coercion, to promote efficiency and
fairness, and to eliminate the appearance of impropriety).
4. George Plunkitt remarked:
"I ain't up on sillygisms, but I can give you some arguments that nobody can
answer. First, this great and glorious country was built up by political
parties; second, parties can't hold together if their workers don't get offices
when they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the government they built
up must go to pieces, too; fourth, then therell be h[ell] to pay."
WILLIAM L. RIORDON, PLUNKITr OF TAMMsANY HALL 13 (1963); see also Cynthia
Grant Bowman, The Law of Patronageat a Crossroads, 12 J.L. & POL. 341, 343
(1996) (relating the Supreme Court's decision in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976),
in which the Court recognized that elected governments have an interest in ensuring
the political loyalty of employees).
5. Refer to Part II.A.1 infra (describing the development of legislation aimed
at restricting the political involvement of public employees).
6. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
7. Refer to Part fl.B infra (detailing the differences and similarities between
the Hatch Act and similar legislation at the state level).
8. Refer to Part m.A-B infra (discussing the practice of patronage and the
treatment that courts have given to its practice).
9. Refer to Part l1A.2 infra (discussing cases pertaining to the regulation of
political activities by public employees) and Part I.B infra (discussing cases
dealing with the practice of patronage).
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been unsympathetic to government's defense of patronage."0 The
Supreme Court has essentially prohibited adverse employment
decisions based on political affiliation, subject to a narrow set of
exceptions." In taking this markedly pro-employee view, the courts
rejected the argument raised by public employers that patronage
serves some valuable objective and that it is necessary for the
effective and efficient operation of American government.12 Instead,
they have adopted what might best be described as a "partisan
politics" model, which views patronage as a mechanism for political
control that has both costs and benefits. 3 Using this model, courts
have concluded that, except for a limited set of circumstances, the
negative social consequences of patronage outweigh its benefits and,

thus, justify limitations on its use. 4

In contrast, courts have taken a much more pro-employer
approach with regard to the regulation of public employees'
political activities, often upholding government restrictions on
public employees' political activities. 5 Courts have justified these
restrictions on the basis of efficiency, impartiality, and the
protection of public employees' interests. 6 We refer to this set of
justifications as the "good government" model.

10. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368-69 (1976) (holding that the
preservation of a democratic process does not justify the dismissal of employees who
choose to exercise their freedom of expression).
11. See O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720-21 (1996)
(holding that decisions prohibiting patronage discharges extend to prohibit the
discharge of independent contractors); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 79
(1990) (pointing out that the prohibition against discharge based on patronage also
extends to promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions); Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (noting that patronage may be exercised only if party affiliation
is required for the effective performance of the office involved); Elrod, 427 U.S. at
367 (holding that employees may be discharged under patronage practices only if the
employees held policy making positions).
12. Refer to notes 149-57 infra and accompanying text (discussing the
justifications offered by the government to defend its patronage practices and
explaining why courts rejected the justifications).
13. Refer to notes 185-95 infra and accompanying text (pointing out that while
courts have recognized that an efficient operation of government is a legitimate
governmental interest, they have nevertheless placed significant restrictions on the
practice of patronage).
14. Refer to notes 145-64 infra and accompanying text (detailing the treatment
of patronage cases and the restrictions that have been imposed on the practice
15. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973) (holding that restricting the political activities of
public employees is constitutionally permitted if it is justified by the need to provide
efficient government); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99
(1947) (holding that Congress can constitutionally restrict active partisan political
activity of federal employees).
16. Refer to notes 55-57 infra and accompanying text (listing the justifications
supporting the prohibitions on the political participation of public employees).
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In this Article, we argue that the courts' differential
treatment of patronage and restrictions on public employees'
political activities is unwarranted because both are mechanisms
of political control and, thus, should be treated similarly. When
governments implement restrictive Hatch Act-type legislation,
they are controlling the ability of public employees to be
politically involved to a similar degree as would occur if they
were conditioning public employment on prospective employees'
political affiliations. 7 Further, we posit that laws regulating the
political activities of public employees are motivated by the
desire of legislators to achieve re-election and, thus, manipulate
the political process as much as occurs under a patronage
system.18 In fact, despite rhetoric to the contrary, a review of the
politics surrounding passage of legislation restricting
government employees' political activities reveals that politics,
not good government, are driving policymaking in this important
area of public employment law. 9
The Article starts by reviewing, in Part II, the history of the
regulation of political activities by public employees, and in Part
III, the regulation of patronage. Part IV develops the argument
that both sets of regulations, although justified on different
grounds, are better understood as political control mechanisms.
Part V provides some empirical evidence for this argument by
examining voting patterns on federal legislation restricting
public employees' political activities. Part VI discusses the
relationship of these laws to public sector unionization. Part VII
concludes the Article.
II. REGULATING THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES: THE HATCH ACT AND BEYOND

A. FederalRegulation: The HatchAct
1. Early Regulatory Efforts. Regulation of federal
employees' political activities dates to the early days of the
Republic."0 The Jefferson Administration, for example, was
17. Refer to notes 29-37 infra and accompanying text (discussing the
enactment of the Hatch Act and the prohibitions it proscribed on the ability of public
employees to participate in partisan politics).
18. Refer to Part V.B.1 infra (discussing the motives behind Hatch Act-type
legislation).
19. Refer to Part V.B.1 infra.
20. For example, in 1791, Congress attempted to pass legislation "to prevent
Inspectors [of distilled spirits], or any officers under them, from interfering, either
directly or indirectly, in elections, further than giving their own votes." 2 ANNALS OF
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steadfast in its belief that the aims of efficiency and neutrality in
government service could best be achieved by restricting public
servants' involvement in the political affairs of the nation.21 By
means of executive order, Jefferson declared that officers of the
government could not attempt "to influence the votes of others
nor take any part in the business of electioneering, that being
deemed inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution and his
duties to it." 2 Efforts to foster political neutrality continued
through a series of similar Executive Orders issued during the
1800s.' These early regulatory efforts are noteworthy because
they were 24
designed to eliminate abuses associated with political
patronage.
The restrictions contained in the various Executive Orders
were later compiled in Civil Service Rule I,' which prohibited
merit system employees from using their official authority or
influence either to coerce the political action of any person or
body or to interfere with any election. 6 In 1907, President
Roosevelt amended Rule I to include a provision explicitly stating
that individuals under the scope of the Rule could take no active
part in political management or in political campaigns.27 During
CONG. 1876 (1791). Ten years later, in 1801, Thomas Jefferson called for the political
neutrality of government employees stating that federal employees should not
"attempt to influence the votes of others nor take any part in the business of
electioneering." RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 99.
21. See RICHARDSON, supra note 2, at 98-99 (noting the issuance of an order
restricting the participation of federal officers in elections promulgated by President
Jefferson in 1801).
22. Id. at 99.
23. For example, in 1886, President Grover Cleveland warned federal
employees by means of executive order "against the use of their official positions in
attempts to control political movements in their localities." Id. at 494 (discussing
several executive orders issued during the 1870s).
24. See Thomas H. Roback, Patronage,Merit, and the Bill of Rights: Evolution
and Current Trends in Public Employment, 16 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 326, 330 (1992)
(pointing out that the first efforts to regulate the individual political activity of
public employees and the regulation of patronage occurred around the same time).
The connection between the prohibition of political activities and patronage is
exemplified by the Civil Service Act of 1883, Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403
(1883). The Pendleton Act created a civil service system that intended to promote
greater efficiency in government service via the merit selection of qualified
candidates. See id. § 2. The Act's primary goal was to curtail the patronage system
by placing specific prohibitions on the political activities of covered public servants.
See id. The Act stated that no individual by reason of his public position was under
an obligation to make a political contribution, see id., nor could he use his position to
coerce anyone to act or refrain from acting in a partisan manner. See id. The Act also
prohibited covered employees from soliciting or receiving political contributions from
fellow employees. See id. § 14.
25. 5 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1939), reprintedin 2 P.A.R. 3 (1975).
26. See id.
27. Exec. Order No. 642, reprinted in 1 PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTiVE ORDERS 61
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this period, the Civil Service Commission, the agency in charge of
enforcing Civil Rule I, applied the rule to over 3000 cases,
creating a large body of case law in this area.'
Ongoing concerns about the politicization of public service
led Congress to enact the Hatch Act in 1939.29 Section 9(a) of the
Hatch Act was basically a restatement of Civil Service Rule I and
provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed in the
executive branch of the Federal Government, or any
agency or department thereof, to use his official
authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with
an election or affecting the result thereof. No officer or
employee in the executive branch of the Federal
Government, or any other agency or department thereof,
shall take any active part in political management or in
political campaigns. All such persons shall retain the
right to vote as they may choose and to express their
opinions on all political subjects."
The penalty for violating the Hatch Act was removal from
office unless the enforcing agency determined by unanimous vote
that a violation did not warrant removal, in which case a
minimum penalty of suspension without pay for thirty days was
imposed.3 In addition to covering federal employees, the Act
applied to state and local employees whose principal employment
was connected to an activity financed by federal loans or grants."
After the passage of the Hatch Act, numerous problems
arose with its application.33 Perhaps the most contentious aspect
of the law was a provision in Section 9(a) prohibiting active
participation in political management or in political campaigns."'
The problem was largely definitional, because the language "'any
(1944).
28. See Rose, supra note 2, at 510-11. Among the activities found to violate
Rule I were running for partisan political office as a member of a political party,
soliciting funds for political campaigns, and writing a single letter to the newspaper
in opposition to a particular candidate for office. See Michael Bridges, Comment,
Release the Gags: The HatchAct and CurrentLegislative Reform-Another Voice for
Reform, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 237, 244 (1993).
29. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (current
version at 5 U.S.C. § 7321 (1994)).
30. Id. § 9(a).
31. See 5 U.S.C. § 7326 (1994).
32. See id. § 1501(4).
33. See Bridges, supra note 28, at 246 (noting that part of the language in the
statute was too vague).
34. In particular, the distinction between the right to express an opinion about
a political candidate and the prohibition against "any active part in political
management or in political campaigns" was unclear in the 1939 legislation. See id.
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active part in political management or in political campaigns"
was not defined within the statute. Congress attempted to
remedy this problem in the 1940 amendments to the Hatch Act,
which defined the term "active part in political management or in
political campaigns" by referencing the Civil Service Commission
rulings prior to June 19, 1940 under Civil Service Rule 1.36 By
doing so, the 1940 Amendments incorporated the approximately
3000 rulings of the Civil Service Commission into the definition
of the terms "active part in political management or in political
campaigns. 37
2. Judicial Reaction. The constitutionality of the Hatch
Act has been challenged in several important cases. The first
case to reach the Supreme Court was United Public Workers of
America v. Mitchell.8 Mitchell involved the termination of a
public employee because of his participation in election day
activity as a poll watcher and paymaster for other party
workers." The Court phrased the issue to be decided as whether
35. See id.
36. See Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940). In particular, Section
15 provided that:
[Tihe provisions of this Act which prohibit persons to whom such provisions
apply from taking any active part in political management or in political
campaigns shall be deemed to prohibit the same activities on the part of
such persons as the United States Civil Service Commission has heretofore
determined are at the time this section,takes effect prohibited on the part of
employees in the classified civil service of the United States by the
provisions of the civil-service rules prohibiting such employees from taking
any active part in political management or in political campaigns.
Id.
37. See Rose, supra note 2, at 513-14 (explaining that by amending the Hatch
Act, Congress incorporated by reference all the administrative determinations under
Rule I). The amendments incorporating the prior rulings of the Commission into the
Hatch Act did not solve the definitional problem. In particular, Section 9(a)
continued to provide a blurred distinction between prohibited and permissive
behavior. For example, accepted political activities under the Act included
registering and voting, privately expressing political opinions about candidates and
issues, and belonging to political organizations without taking an active part. See
Project: Collective Bargainingand Politics in Public Employment, 19 UCLA L. REV.
887, 968 (1972). Proscribed behaviors included soliciting contributions for or
endorsing candidates in partisan elections, being candidates in partisan elections, or
distributing campaign materials in partisan elections. See id. Thus, under these
regulations, federal employees were allowed to speak publicly on political subjects,
but not at a political gathering; attend a political convention, but not serve as a
delegate; allowed to sign a nominating petition, but not circulate it; allowed to place
a bumper sticker on their car, but could not give a bumper sticker to a friend. Cf id.
(noting that public employees were allowed to privately express opinions about
issues and candidates and issues and to take a passive role in political organization
membership).
38. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
39. See id. at 94.
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"a breach of the Hatch Act and Rule I of the [U.S. Civil Service]
Commission can, without violating the Constitution, be made the
basis for disciplinary action."0
In answering this question, the Supreme Court first found
that the Constitution granted Congress the authority to enact
such legislation.4' In particular, the Court noted that Congress
had the power to enact, within reasonable limits, regulations
defining the scope of permissible political activities engaged in by
employees.42 The Court held that it would defer to legislative
discretion, unless such legislation "passe[d] beyond the generally
existing conception of governmental power."" According to the
Court, these powers must be determined from "practice, history,
and changing educational, social, and economic conditions.""
In determining whether Congress had the power to enact
such legislation, the Court discussed the objectives underlying
the Hatch Act's regulation of political activities.45 The Court
found that the Hatch Act was intended to eliminate the
corrupting influence that political patronage was having on the
political process and public service.46 According to the Court, the
corrupting influence of patronage was manifested in the loss of
efficiency, neutrality, and the possibility of coercing an employee
into political activity he or she did not wish to pursue.47 In
conclusion, the Court reasoned that, once legitimate ends were
established, Congress needed only to achieve those ends through
reasonable means, which the Court found Congress had done.4"
In United States Civil Service Commission v. NationalAss'n
49 the Court again confronted a challenge to the
of Letter Carriers,
0
Hatch Act." The case involved a complaint by various employee
groups seeking injunctive relief because they alleged that the
Hatch Act's prohibitions found in 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) were
unconstitutional on its face.5 In particular, the Act was
40. Id.
41. "If,in [the judgment of Congress and the President], efficiency maybe best
obtained by prohibiting active participation by classified employees in politics as
party officers or workers, we see no constitutional objection." Id. at 99.
42. See id. at 102.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 98-99, 103 (pointing out that the Hatch Act was passed in part to
maintain the integrity and efficiency of public service).
46. See id. at 99, 101.
47. See id. at 101.
48. See id. at 101-02.
49. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
50. See id. at 550.
51. See id. at 551.
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challenged as impermissibly vague and overbroad.52 It was
argued that in defining "active part in political management or in
political campaigns" by incorporating the 3000 plus decisions
previously decided by the Commission, Congress had made it
constitutionally unreasonable for a reasonable person to know
from reading the statute which actions were prohibited and
which were permitted.5 3
Following Mitchell, the Court held that the appropriate
standard by which the regulation should be judged is a balancing
test, where the scales to be balanced involve the individual's
interest in pursuing partisan political activity versus the
interests of the government as an employer in promoting
efficiency and neutrality. 4 Having re-affirmed the standard
established in Mitchell, the Supreme Court proceeded to
enunciate five governmental interests supporting the restrictions
imposed under the Hatch Act.55 As it had done before, the Court
recognized the validity of government's interests in efficiency and
neutrality, as well as the protection of the employee from being
coerced into voting or taking part in political activities against
his will. 5 The Court also accepted the government's interest in
maintaining the appearance of impartial administration of the
law, and in avoiding the possibility that public service would be
turned into a powerful political machine.57
The efficiency argument is not without limits. In Pickeringv.
5 8 the Supreme Court addressed the
Board of Education,
government's ability to restrict public employees' freedom of
speech." As in Letter Carriers,the Court had to decide what kind
of restrictions the government can impose on the free speech
rights of public employees. ° Pickering involved a high school
52. See id. at 568.
53. See id. at 570-71.
54. "The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the [government], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 564 (alterations in original)
(quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
55. See id. at 564-67.
56. See id. at 566-67 (agreeing with the holding in United Public Workers of
America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), and pointing out the importance of
maintaining neutrality in government and protecting public employees from
coercion).
57. See id. at 565.
58. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
59. See id. at 563.
60. See id. at 565 (addressing whether a school teacher's dismissal for writing a
letter to a newspaper criticizing the Board of Education and district
superintendent's actions violated the teacher's First Amendment rights).
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teacher who had been fired for his comments in a local
newspaper criticizing the Board of Education and district
superintendent's handling of certain financial matters. 61 The
School Board defended the teacher's termination on efficiency
grounds. 62 According to the defendants, the teacher's statements
were not only false, but allowing them would "tend to foment
'controversy, conflict and dissension' among teachers,
administrators, the Board of Education, and the residents of the
district."63 Recognizing the tension between the individual's right
to free speech and the government's interest in maintaining
orderly and effective public service, the Court adopted a
balancing test to determine when government may restrict a
public employee's freedom of speech."
The Pickering Court considered four factors in deciding65
whether the government may restrict a public employee's speech:
first, whether the speech affects the government's ability to
66
maintain discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers;
second, whether the employment relationship between a speaker
and her employer involves "the kind of close working relationships
for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary to their proper functioning";67 third,
whether the speech hinders an employee's ability to perform his
job;" and finally, whether the speech affects an employer's ability
to provide government services in an effective manner.69 The
Court answered all four questions of the inquiry in the negative,
concluding that the dismissed teacher's right to speak on an issue
of public concern outweighed the school board's interest in
maintaining the efficient operation of its school system.70
The Pickering case and its progeny stand as a nice contrast
to the Mitchell and Letter Carriers decisions. Taken together,
61. See id. at 564, 566.
62. See id. at 564-65.
63. Id. at 566-67.
64. See id. at 568-69 (adopting a balancing test to use when analyzing whether
a public employee's free speech rights have been violated).
65. See id. at 569-73.
66. See id. at 569-70.
67. Id. at 570.
68. See id. at 572-73.
69. See id. at 571-73.
70. See id. at 565, 574-75. The Court has continued to adhere to Pickering in
similar types of cases. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140, 150-53 (1983)
(following the Pickering balancing test and clarifying the scope of permissible
restrictions on public employees' speech by considering additional factors); Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 390 (1987) (following Pickering, but adding an
additional criterion to be weighed in the balancing test-the level of responsibility
accorded the employee).
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these cases demonstrate that public employees' speech can be
restricted based on government's interest in efficiently providing
public services.7 Free speech outweighed efficiency in Pickering,
7 Government's
but not in Mitchell and Letter Carriers.
interest
in efficiency is at the center of the debate regarding restrictions
on public employee's political activities, and as these two lines of
cases illustrate, its validity is somewhat unclear.73
3. Recent Legislative Developments. The basic principles
embedded in the Hatch Act remained unaltered for fifty-odd
years after its enactment,7 4 despite several attempts to amend
it. 75 In 1993, however, Congress passed, and President Clinton
71. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 555-56 (1973) (reaffirming that if Congress decides that providing
efficient government services requires prohibiting federal employees from engaging
in active partisan politics, then such prohibitions are constitutional); Pickering,391
U.S. at 568 (developing a balancing test that allows a government to set restrictions
on an employee's speech only if the government's efficiency losses are greater than
the encroachment on the individual's freedom of speech); United Pub. Workers of
Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947) (concluding that Congress can
constitutionally restrict active partisan political activity by federal employees if
providing an efficient public service requires such restrictions).
72. Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73 (finding that a schoolteacher's
speech rights had been violated because the teacher's right to free speech on a
matter of public concern was greater than the Board of Education's loss in
efficiency), with Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 564 (applying the Pickering balancing
test and concluding that the limits Congress placed on the partisan political
activities by federal employees under the Hatch Act are within constitutional
boundaries given a congressional determination that the limits are necessary in
order to provide efficient government services), and Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99 (finding
a federal employee's constitutional rights were not violated because a determination
had been made by Congress that efficiency needs required that restrictions be placed
on the partisan political activities engaged in by federal employees).
73. See Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564, 567 (finding that government's
efficiency needs justified the limitations placed on the rights of federal employees to
participate in partisan political activities); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73 (finding
that the government's efficiency needs were not greater than the free speech rights
of employee); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 94, 99 (noting that the issue is whether the right
to free speech through partisan political activity is greater than the need for an
efficient government, and concluding that congressional determination that
government efficiency needs are greater is constitutionally valid).
74. Various minor amendments have been enacted over the years, however.
For example, in 1950 the sanction for violating the Hatch Act was reduced from
automatic teimination to the possibility of suspension without pay. See Act of Aug.
25, 1950, ch. 784, 64 Stat. 475, 475 (1950) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7326
(1994)) (amending the Hatch Act). In 1974, Congress again amended the Hatch Act
by lessening its application to state and local employees. See Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 401, 88 Stat. 1263, 1290
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994)) (amending the Hatch Act to allow
state and local employees to be candidates in nonpartisan elections).
75. Legislation to reform the Hatch Act was proposed several times between
1940 and 1992. See 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC: 101ST CONGRESS 2ND SESSION 1990, at
408 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 CONG. Q. ALMANAC] (discussing failed efforts by
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signed into law, the Hatch Act Reform Amendments. 6 In general,
the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993 lifted the restrictions
on active participation in political management or political
campaigns by federal employees.77 The two major portions of the
amended Act are 5 U.S.C. §§ 7323 and 7324.78 Under § 7323,
covered employees are explicitly permitted to actively participate
in political management and political campaigns. 9 Section 7323,
however, still prohibits employees from using their official
authority to interfere with or affect the results of an election and
from running as a candidate for election to a partisan political
office.8" Employees who are subject to the Hatch Act are also
prohibited from knowingly soliciting, accepting, or receiving a
political contribution from any person, unless such person meets
the following criteria: (1) a member of the same federal labor
organization; (2) not a subordinate employee; and (3) the
contribution is for the multi-candidate political committee of such
federal labor organization.8 1
Congress in 1990 and previous years to amend the Hatch Act). On two occasions,
such legislation passed both houses of Congress but was subjected to a presidential
veto. See id. President Ford vetoed the Federal Employees' Political Activities Act of
1976 arguing that "pressures could be brought to bear on federal employees in
extremely subtle ways beyond the reach of any anti-coercion statute so that they
would inevitably feel compelled to engage in partisan political activity." See
Statement by President Gerald R. Ford Upon Vetoing the Hatch Act Amendments
Bill, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1114, 1115 (Apr. 12, 1976). Similar arguments were raised by
President Bush in vetoing the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1990. See
Statement by President George Bush to the House of Representatives Upon
Returning Without Approval the Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1990, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 830, 831 (June 15, 1990) (commenting that enactment of the Hatch Act
Reform Amendments would result in "unstated but enormous pressure to participate
in partisan political activity").
76. See 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC: 103RD CONGRESS IST SESSION 1993, at 201
(1994) [hereinafter 1993 CONG. Q. ALMANAC]. House Bill H.R. 20, introduced by
Reps. William L. Clay and John Myers, was passed on March 3, 1993 and as
amended by the Senate on September 21, 1993. See id.; 139 CONG. REC. H82 (daily
ed. Jan. 5, 1993). The Senate version, S. 185, which was basically the one enacted
into law, was introduced by Sen. John Glenn and passed the Senate on July 20,
1993. See 1993 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra, at 201.
77. See Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, § 2, 107
Stat. 1001, 1001-04 (1993) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (1994)).
78. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7323-7324 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999) (authorizing federal
employees to engage in most political activities, but also prohibiting the
participation in these activities while on duty or under other specified conditions).
79. See id. § 7323(a).
80. See id. § 7323(a)(1), (3).
81. See id. § 7323(a)(2)(A)-(C). Interestingly, the House version of the bill was
more permissive than the Senate version that was ultimately enacted into law. See
1993 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 76, at 201, 203. For example, the House-passed
bill would have permitted federal employees to solicit contributions on behalf of
partisan candidates, whereas the proposed Senate Hatch Act amendments permitted
solicitation only on behalf of the multi-candidate political action committees for
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Section 7324 of the 1993 Amendments attempts to clarify
the line between prohibited and permissible activities by banning
political activities while an employee is on duty in any room or
building occupied in the discharge of official duties and while
wearing a uniform or official insignia or using any government
vehicle.8 2
Proponents of the 1993 reforms defended lifting the
restrictions on political activities on three grounds. First, they
argued that by making a clear distinction between on-the-job and
off-the-job conduct, the 1993 amendments would make the Hatch
Act tougher than before because the amendments would prohibit
all political activity while on duty. 3 Second, supporters argued
that the reforms would either eliminate or clarify rules that were
confusing, nonsensical, and often contradictory.8 4 Finally, they
argued that all of this would be accomplished without
compromising the impartial and nonpolitical administration of
the government and the protection for federal employees against
political abuses because the reforms would continue to
specifically prohibit political coercion and manipulation.85
In contrast, opponents of the reforms saw a significant
danger in lifting the restrictions, namely the unleashing of
"irresistable [sic] pressures to become a captive soldier in
political armies inside and outside the government." 6 They
argued that the legislation "would undercut the neutral,
nonpartisan administration of programs by civil servants [and
that] [i]t would nourish a working environment where politics
replaces merit."8 7 Opponents pointed out that the Hatch Act,
rather than oppressing federal employees, protected them
against inside and outside coercion. 8
federal employees' organizations. See 139 CONG. REC. S8604-05 (daily ed. July 13,
1993) (statement of Sen. Glenn). Similarly, while the House-passed bill retained the
Hatch Act restrictions only on the political activities of employees of the Federal
Election Commission, the Senate bill retained those restrictions for a much larger
group of employees. See 139 CONG. REC. H6817 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1993) (statement
of Rep. Clay) (including within its restrictions Senior Executive Services members,
law enforcement, and intelligence agency employees, among others).
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(1)-(4).
83. See 139 CONG. REC. H6817 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Clay); 139 CONG. REC. S8941 (daily ed. July 20, 1993) (statement of Sen. Glenn).
84. See 139 CONG. REC. S8941 (daily ed. July 20, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Glenn).
85. See 139 CONG. REC. H6819 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Gilman); id. at 6817 (statement of Rep. Clay).
86. S. REP. NO. 103-57, at 24 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825, 1825
(minority views of Sens. Roth, Cohen and Cochran).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 25, reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1825, 1826 (arguing that the
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An analysis of Hatch Act complaints brought before and
after the 1993 amendments suggests that the experience under
the amendments has been generally positive. Table 1 shows the
number of Hatch Act complaints filed between 1986 and 1998
and the number of those complaints that resulted in disciplinary
action being brought by the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC)
before the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)"
Table 1
Hatch Act Complaints and Charges
1986-1998a
Number of Cases Brought
By the OSC Before the MSPB
(Percentage of the Total Number of
Complaints)
1986
83
2 (2.4%)
1987
78
6 (7.7%)
1988
80
11 (13.8%)
1989
102
5 (4.9%)
1990
149
1 (0.7%)
1991
92
3 (3.3 %)
1992
137
13 (9.5%)
1993
134
24 (17.9%)
1994
130
9 (6.9%)
1995
104
3 (2.9%)
1996
108
3 (2.8%)
1997
75
3 (4.0%)
1998
83
0 (0%)
a See United States Office of Special Counsel, A Report to
Congress from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, for Fiscal Year
1998, at 18 tbl.5 (1998); United States Office of Special Counsel,
A Report to Congress from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, for
Fiscal Year 1995, at 13 (1995); United States Office of Special
Counsel, A Report to Congress from the U.S. Office of Special
Counsel, for Fiscal Year 1992, at 15 (1992); United States Office
of Special Counsel, A Report to Congress from the U.S. Office of
Special Counsel, for Fiscal Year 1991, at 15 (1991); United States
Fiscal
Year

Number of
Complaints

Hatch Act functions as a civil rights act for federal employees by ensuring, for
example, that they are not pressured by their supervisors to participate in political
activities).
89. The OSC is the federal investigative and prosecutorial agency with
jurisdiction under the Hatch Act to enforce restrictions on political activity by
government employees. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211(a), 1216(a)(1)-(2), (c) (1994).
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Office of Special Counsel, A Report to Congress from the U.S.
Office of Special Counsel, for Fiscal Year 1990, at 14 (1990);
United States Office of Special Counsel, A Report to Congress
from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, for Fiscal Year 1989, at
14 (1989); United States Office of Special Counsel, A Report to
Congress from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, for Fiscal Year
1988, at 2, 10 (1988); United States Office of Special Counsel, A
Report to Congress from the U.S. Office of Special for Fiscal Year
1987, at 2 (1987); United States Office of Special Counsel, A
Report to Congress from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, for
Fiscal Year 1986, at 12 (1986).
As shown in Table 1, there has been a steady decline in the
filing of Hatch Act complaints since the effective date of the
amendments in February, 1994.90 From a high of 134 complaints
in 1993, the number of complaints has declined almost every
fiscal year to a low of 75 complaints in 1997, followed by a slight
rise in 1998 to 83 complaints. 9 Similarly, the OSC has sought
disciplinary action in a decreasing percentage of cases since the
effective date of the 1993 amendments.9 2 Since the OSC has had
jurisdiction over all Hatch Act violations involving employees
engaged in illegal political activity, as well as those involving
employees who are pressured to engage in political activity, the
downward trends in complaints and violations suggest that the
amendments have successfully liberalized political participation
without compromising the rights of public employees.
Further evidence of the effects of the 1993 amendments is
found in the results of various surveys conducted by the United
States MSPB. The Board has found that since the 1993 Hatch
Act revisions, 6.5% of federal employees have reported being
more active in partisan political activities, while 12.5% of federal
supervisors have exercised the additional freedom to participate
in politics.93 Likewise, fewer than 1% of respondents reported
90. See Table 1 (listing the number of Hatch Act complaints filed each year
since fiscal year 1986 and showing a decrease in complaints from 134 in 1993 to only
75 in 1997 and 83 in 1998).
91. See id. (listing the number of Hatch Act complaints filed each year since
fiscal year 1986 and showing a decrease from 134 in 1993 to only 75 in 1997 and 83
in 1998).
92. See id.
93. See UNITED STATES MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., OFFICE OF POLICY AND
EVALUATION, ISSUES OF MERIT 5 (1998) [hereinafter ISSUES OF MERIT]. Prior to the
enactment of the 1993 Hatch Act amendments, various studies predicted that repeal
of the Act's restrictions on political activity would result in a significant increase in
political involvement by public employees. See, e.g., William M. Pearson & David S.
Castle, PoliticalActivity Among State Executives: The Effect of Hatch Act Repeal, 19
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having been pressured to engage in political partisan activity
since the 1993 amendments and fewer than 2% reported having
been pressured to retaliate against or take an action in favor of
another federal employee or applicant for political reasons."
B. State Level Regulation: The "LittleHatch"Acts
Regulation of state and local employees' political
participation through so-called "Little Hatch" Acts is both
widespread and diverse. A review of state laws reveals that
thirty-five states have enacted some form of explicit restriction
concerning the ability of state employees to actively engage in
politics." In this Part, we review the main characteristics of
"Little Hatch" Acts and compare them to federal law.
States' "Little Hatch" Acts prohibit a wide range of political
activities. In Table 2, we identify five types of prohibitions and
categorize states based on whether or not they adopted the
prohibition.9 6 For comparison purposes, the five categories are
phrased in terms of the type of activities that are specifically
mentioned in the Hatch Act.9" As amended in 1993, the Hatch Act
allows employees to participate in political campaigns, but
prohibits the following four activities: (1) using official authority
or influence to interfere or affect the results of an election;98 (2)
soliciting financial or manpower contributions from any political
organization or candidate; 9 (3) campaigning for partisan
positions in government;"' and (4) engaging in political activities
while on duty, in uniform, or on government property. 0 '
PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 399, 400-04 (1990) (surveying state supervisory personnel
in eight states and finding there would be an increase in political activities by state
executives in those states if Hatch Act restrictions were repealed).
94. See ISSUES OF MERIT, supra note 93, at 5.
95. See Table 2 (summarizing and listing citations for "Little Hatch" Act
provisions found in thirty-five state statutes). We focus on state employees other
than police and firefighters. These states are: Alabama, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
96. See id. (identifying and categorizing states that have provisions restricting
political activities by public employees).
97. See id. (specifying five different categories of "Little Hatch" Act provisions
contained in state statutes); 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a) (1994) (listing the same prohibitions
under federal law).
98. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(1).
99. See id. § 7323 (a)(2).
100. See id. § 7323 (a)(3).
101. See id. § 7324(a)(1)-(4).
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Table 2
Summary of State Laws Regulating
State Employees' Political Activities

Prohibited Political
Activities
Taking Active Part in
a Political Campaigna

Virginia

Using Official
Authority or Influence
to Interfere or Affect
the Results of an
Electionb

Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, New York, North
Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
West Virginia

Providing or Soliciting
Financial or
Manpower
Contributions to any
Political Organization
or Candidate'

Alabama, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Rhode Island Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia

Holding Political
Positions in
Government'

Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin

Engaging in Political
Activities While on
Duty, in Uniform, or
on Government
Property'

Alabama, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin

a

States
Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, West

See LA. CONST. art. X, § 9(A); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-21(B)

(Michie 1995); OIuo REV. CODE ANN. § 124.57(A) (Anderson
Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-6-20(e)(3) (Michie 1999).
b
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-266a(a)(1) (West 1998); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5954(a) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
104.31(1)(a) (West Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-91(1)
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(Michie 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 19A.18 (West Supp. 2000);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2953(a) (1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ 7056-A(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56,
§ 36 (West 1991); N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 107(1) (McKinney 1999);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-13(a)(2) (1995); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
260.432(1) (Butterworth Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19202(a) (1994); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 556.004(c) (Vernon Supp.
2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-6-20(e)(1) (Michie 1999).
C ALA. CODE § 36-26-38(a) (1991); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3205(a)
(West Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-266a(a)(2) (West
1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5954(c) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 104.31(1)(b) (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-30.2(b)
(1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-91(3)-(4) (Michie 1996); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 75-2974(a) (1997); LA. CONST. art. X, § 9(A)-(B); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7056-A(2) (West Supp. 1999); MD. CODE
ANN. STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-304(d)(2) (Supp. 1998); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, §§ 13-16 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.405 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 43A.32(1) (West Supp. 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 36.150(4) (West
Supp. 2000); N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 107(3) (McKinney 1999);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-14(a) (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
124.57(A); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-4-53 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-19-203(a) (1994); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 556.004(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.06.250(1)
(West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-6-20(d) (Michie 1999).
d
ALA. CODE § 36-26-38(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-2-40(c)
(Michie 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2953(b) (1997); LA. CONST.
art. X, § 9(A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7056-A(4) (West
Supp. 1999); MI-N. STAT. ANN. § 43A.32(2) (West 1999); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 36.150(5)-(6) (West Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 21-1:521 (Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-21(B);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-19(1)(a) (Michie 1996); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 41.06.250(3) (West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-620(e)(3); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 230.40(2) (West Supp. 1999).
0
ALA. CODE § 36-26-38(a); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3206 (West
1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-266a(b) (West 1998); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5954(b) (1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-10-70
(1990); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 320/2 (West 1993); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 19A.18; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7056-A(3) (West
Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN. STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-304(c)(1)
(Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 14 (West 1991);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.404 (West 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §
20-160 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11A:2-23 (West 1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 10-9-21(F) (Michie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12613(a)(1) (Michie 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-08-19(1) (1993);
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R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-4-52 (Michie 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13765(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19206(a), 2-19-207(a) (1994); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 556.004(b);
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 67-19-19(1)(b) (Michie 1996); WIs.

STAT. ANN.

§ 230.40(1) (West Supp. 1999).
An initial way of analyzing information in Table 2 is to
compare the states' approaches to the federal government's
approach. Of the thirty-five states that have enacted "Little
Hatch" Acts, four are more restrictive than the Hatch Act
because they limit the ability of public employees to take an
active part in political campaigning."' Two of these four states
have taken fairly sweeping approaches by, for example,
prohibiting covered employees from taking part "in the
management of the affairs of a political party... or any political
campaign."'03 Two other states, New Mexico and West Virginia,
have adopted a somewhat less restrictive approach by allowing
political participation in general,' but prohibiting covered
employees from becoming members or officers of political
parties."5 Notice that the prohibitions imposed by these four
states are similar to those imposed 0at6 the federal level before the
1993 amendments to the Hatch Act.

Although we can clearly compare these four states to the
amended Hatch Act, it is harder to make definitive comparisons
between the rest of the states' laws and the federal legislation.
The other four activities identified in Table 2 (rows two to five)
are prohibitions currently included in the Hatch Act.0 7 As seen in
102. These states are: Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, and West Virginia. See
Table 2 (categorizing the different types of "Little Hatch" Act provisions contained in
state statutes). Refer to notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text (discussing the
four states that have enacted legislation more restrictive than the Hatch Act).
103. LA. CONST. art. X, § 9(A). A similar approach is taken in Ohio, where public
employees are prohibited from taking "part in politics other than to vote as the...
employee pleases." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.57(A) (Anderson Supp. 1999).
104. For example, West Virginia's statute allows participation in "[olther types
of partisan or nonpartisan political campaigning and management not inconsistent
with the provisions of this subdivision." W. VA. CODE § 29-6-20(e)(3) (Michie 1999).
105. West Virginia's statute provides that "no employee in the classified service
shall... be a candidate or delegate to any state or national political party
convention, [or] a member of any national, state or local committee of a political
party." Id. The New Mexico statute prohibits covered public employees from
becoming officers of a political organization during their employment. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 10-9-21(B) (Michie 1995).
106. Refer to notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text (discussing the broad
political activity prohibitions imposed on public employees under the Hatch Act
enacted in 1939).
107. See Table 2 (listing the different type of activities prohibited under state
Little Hatch" Acts); 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a) (1994) (listing the same type of prohibitions
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Table 2, states vary considerably in terms of the scope of their
political participation restrictions. Fourteen states prohibit using
an employee's official authority to interfere with, or affect,
political processes or outcomes. °8 Twenty-three states prohibit
providing or soliciting financial or manpower contributions to
any political organization or candidate. 9 In addition, thirteen
states prohibit holding political (i.e., elected) positions in
government and twenty-two states specifically prohibit public
employees from engaging in political activities while on duty, in
uniform, or on state property."0
To summarize, four states have statutes more restrictive
than the Hatch Act."' Thirty-one states have adopted legislation
less restrictive than the Hatch Act."' Among these thirty-one
states, nine have adopted restrictions in at least three of the
areas prohibited under federal law,"' fourteen have adopted at
least two of the prohibitions currently found at the federal
level,"' and eight have adopted approaches prohibiting just one of
the activities that are prohibited by the Hatch Act."5
Of the states that restrict three of the activities prohibited at
the federal level, all of them prohibit the providing or soliciting of
financial or manpower contributions to political organizations or
political candidates." 6 Of the fourteen states that regulate at
least two of the activities prohibited at the federal level, ten
regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions."' This
under federal law).
108. See Table 2 (categorizing the different "Little Hatch" Act provisions
contained in state statutes).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Refer to notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text (identifying and
discussing the four states that have statutes imposing greater restrictions on the
political activities of public employees than the Hatch Act).
112. Refer to note 102 supra and accompanying text (observing that thirty-five
states have enacted "Little Hatch" Act provisions of which four have provisions more
restrictive than the Hatch Act).
113. These states are: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. See Table 2 (categorizing the
different "Little Hatch" Act provisions contained in state statutes).
114. These states are: California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See id.
115. These states are: Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Oregon, and South Carolina. See id.
116. Refer to note 113 supra (listing the nine states). See Table 2 (categorizing
the different "Little Hatch" Act provisions contained in state statutes).
117. These states are: California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan,
Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. Refer to note 114 supra
(listing the fourteen states that regulate at least two of the activities prohibited at
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suggests some consensus that restrictions on partisan campaign
contributions are an important part of what "Hatch Act"-type

laws seek to accomplish. As we will discuss later, this finding
supports our main argument that these restrictions are primarily
a form of political control."'
III. PATRONAGE
Paradoxically, the extensive efforts of both federal and state
governments to maintain a politically free environment at the
workplace have been coupled with an equally extensive use of
political patronage." 9 In its broadest sense, patronage refers to
"the allocation of the discretionary favors of government in
exchange for political support."' More narrowly, the practice
involves the reward of government jobs in exchange for providing
support to a candidate during an election. 2' Patronage developed
and flourished at the same time the federal government and
various state governments attempted to limit the political
activities of public employees. 2 Interestingly, while one of the
justifications advanced for Hatch Act-type laws was to curtail the
effects of patronage, the practice of patronage itself was not
challenged until fairly recently in our constitutional history. 2 ' In
the federal level). See Table 2 (categorizing the different types of "Little Hatch" Act
provisions contained in state statutes).
118. Refer to Part V.B infra (developing and testing an empirical model to
explain congressional voting outcomes on Hatch Act amendments, and concluding
that regression analysis results support the hypothesis that Hatch Act restrictions
against political activities are motivated by partisan politics).
119. Refer to notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text (discussing how early
actions regulating the political activities of public employees were designed to curtail
patronage abuses). Refer to note 122 infra and accompanying text (noting that
patronage and Hatch Act-type legislation flourished at the same time).
120. MARTIN TOLCHIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, To THE VICTOR . . . POLITICAL
PATRONAGE FROM THE CLUBHOUSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE 5 (1971). A more
humorous definition is provided by James Q. Wilson, a political scientist, who
defines patronage jobs as "all those posts, distributed at the discretion of political
leaders, the pay for which is greater than the value of the public services
performed." James Q. Wilson, The Economy of Patronage,69 J. POL. ECON. 369, 370
n.4 (1961).
121. See Richard L. Hasen, An EnrichedEconomic Model of PoliticalPatronage
and Campaign Contributions: Reformulating Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1311, 1311 n.1 (1993). Patronage also includes the award "of
government contracts to members of the ruling party or to major campaign
contributors." Kathryn E. Eisenhart, The FirstAmendment and the Public Sector
Employee: The Effect of Recent Patronage Cases on Public Sector Personnel
Decisions,REV. OF PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN., Summer 1998, at 58, 59.
122. See Roback, supra note 24, at 330 (pointing out that the first efforts to
regulate the individual political activity of public employees and the regulation of
patronage occurred around the same time).
123. "Suffice it to say that patronage was, without any thought that it could be
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this Part, we describe the legal framework that has been used to
analyze patronage.
A. Early Views
American political patronage dates back to the administration
of George Washington.'24 While politically motivated dismissals
have always been controversial, a number of justifications for such
practices have been successfully advanced over the years.' First
is the frequently asserted proposition that elected officials need
loyal supporters who can effectuate their policies.'26 In this sense,
patronage could result in a more efficient offering of public
services by a government that is increasingly accountable and
responsive to the public.' Second, patronage has been justified as
helping to preserve the democratic process by strengthening the
party system.1" Finally, patronage has been defended based on its
quasi-welfare functions, and as an instrument of social acceptance
for minorities." 9

Despite these justifications and patronage's common
occurrence during the early years of the Republic, 3 ' the public
has never been comfortable with the use of patronage. Indeed,
"legislative attacks on patronage began as early as 1883, when
corruption in the Grant administration and Garfield's
assassination by an unsuccessful office-seeker prompted the
passage of the Pendleton Act." 3 ' The Pendleton Act, which has
unconstitutional, a basis for government employment from the earliest days of the
Republic until Elrod-and has continued unabated since Elrod, to the extent still
permitted by that unfortunate decision." Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 96
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court has no basis for
holding patronage practices unconstitutional because such practices have a long,
unchallenged tradition).
124. See Jaimie Johnson, Note, O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake.
FurtherLimiting the Spoils of the Victor, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 489, 491 (1998)
(tracing political patronage back to the Washington administration).
125. See id.; see also Kathleen M. Dugan, Note, An Objective and PracticalTest
for Adjudicating Political Patronage Dismissals, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 277, 279
(1987) (detailing historical justifications for patronage).
126. See Dugan, supra note 125, at 279 (acknowledging that political leaders can
use patronage to ensure they have loyal supporters).
127. See id. (detailing traditional justifications for political patronage and noting
that amongst them is the notion that patronage will create more accountability and
responsiveness to the public).
128. See Johnson, supra note 124, at 491 (identifying the strengthening of
political parties as a traditional justification of patronage).
129. See Dugan, supra note 125, at 279.
130. See Roback, supra note 24, at 328-30 (detailing the history of patronage
and noting that its practice predates the Constitution and has been found in colonial
charters and state constitutions).
131. Johnson, supra note 124, at 492 (footnote omitted).
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been described as marking the birth of the federal merit civil
service system,'32 provided a nonpartisan basis for the dismissal
and hiring of government employees by requiring competitive
examinations. 3 ' Similar legislation was subsequently passed at
the state and local government levels.' However, although
political patronage has been largely eliminated at the federal
level, similar success has not been achieved at the state and local
levels." 5
Prior to the 1970s, constitutional challenges to patronage
met with little success." 6 Nonetheless, municipal, county, and
state employees who were dismissed solely for political reasons
continued to challenge the constitutionality of patronage
employment

decisions. 1 7

Courts,

however,

"considered

government employment a privilege, not a right, and allowed the
government to condition the receipt of that privilege on waiver of
First Amendment rights.""8 Under the "privilege doctrine,"
"courts allowed the government 'broader discretion in denying
privileges that it bestows than in denying constitutional rights
that it must recognize.'"" 9
B. Current View of Patronage
In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court rejected the "privilege
doctrine," thus paving the way for a direct attack on the practice
of patronage.4 ' In Perry v. Sindermann,'' for example, the Court
132. See Roback, supra note 24, at 330-31 (documenting the expansion of the
merit system from its beginning, with the Pendleton Act in 1883, through 1932,
when it covered 80% of federal employees).
133. See 5 U.S.C. § 3304(a)-(b) (1994).
134. See Dugan, supra note 125, at 280-81 (noting that federal efforts to curtail
patronage abuses were paralleled at the state and local level).
135. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 4, at 356-57 (concluding that in Illinois, for
example, party affiliation still provides an advantage for applicants of state jobs).
136. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (explaining
that, unless protected by civil service regulations, public employees had no right to
employment and could be dismissed for political reasons).
137. See Dugan, supra note 125, at 281-82 (noting that for the last twenty years,
there has been a great deal of litigation dealing with patronage related dismissals).
138. Johnson, supra note 124, at 493; see also, e.g., Bailey, 182 F.2d at 51
(refusing to order the government to disclose the names of informants who alleged
that plaintiff was disloyal to the government); American Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees v. Sharp, 280 A.2d 375, 378 (Pa. 1971) (holding that there is no
right to government employment under either the Federal or Pennsylvania
constitution).
139. Johnson, supra note 124, at 493.
140. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (rejecting the concept
that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized
as a "right" or as a "privilege").
141. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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held that a government employee could not be denied a benefit
for exercising his First Amendment rights. The Court stated
that:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made
clear that even though a person has no "right" to a
valuable governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons, there are some reasons upon which the
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of
speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech or
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in
effect be penalized and inhibited.'
With the "privilege doctrine" out of the picture, "the stage
was set for the Supreme Court to take a decided stance against
patronage."'" The Supreme Court's first direct encounter with a
challenge to the use of patronage came in the case of Elrod v.
Burns.45 In Elrod, a group of non-civil service employees brought
suit against a newly elected Democratic sheriff, alleging that
their termination amounted to a violation of their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.'46 The employees' dismissals
resulted from their lack of affiliation with the Democratic
party.'47 Addressing the constitutionality of patronage dismissals,
a divided Court held that patronage violates the First
Amendment because it restrains a public employee's freedom of
political belief and association.'48
The Government offered three defenses for its use of
patronage. First, the Government cited the need for effective
governance of the workplace and efficient employees."' The Court
rejected that justification, arguing instead that the "wholesale
replacement of large numbers of public employees every time
142. See id. at 596-98 (reaffirming earlier rulings that a government does not
have the right to terminate employment due to exercise of First Amendment rights).
143. Id. at 597.
144. Johnson, supra note 124, at 494.
145. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
146. See id. at 349-50 (seeking declaratory, injunctive, and other relief).
147. See id. at 351 (noting the Cook County tradition of allowing the Sheriff,
upon election, to replace non-civil service employees with members of the Sheriffs
party).
148. See id. at 372-73 (dismissing the notion that benefits of patronage outweigh
the infringement on First Amendment rights in a plurality opinion written by
Justice Brennan in which Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger dissented).
149. See id. at 364.
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political office changes hands" created inefficiencies equal to or
greater than those caused by retention of employees who do not
share political affiliation with the governing party.15 Second, the
government argued that patronage was vital to the democratic
process because it ensured the vitality of political parties and,
hence, the two-party system. 5 ' The Court summarily dismissed
this argument, commenting that the elimination of patronage
would not bring about the demise of party politics.'5 2 Finally, the
Government raised a loyalty argument by arguing that
patronage was necessary to ensure that employees would not
undermine the implementation of new policies sanctioned by the
electorate.'' While somewhat sympathetic to this argument, the
Court found that it did not validate the need for patronage in all
cases."' Instead, the Court argued that limiting patronage to
policymaking positions was sufficient to achieve governmental
ends.' 5
Based upon this last response, the Court adopted a
categorical approach to patronage cases to separate those
positions of public employment that can be subject to patronage
from those that cannot. 55 Recognizing that when there is a
change in political administrations, newly elected officials need
to bring in their own people to help implement political policies,
the Court held that policymaking positions are the only positions
subject to patronage dismissals. 7
150. See id. at 364. The Court also noted that the possibility of dismissal after
an election in which the incumbent party had lost could amount to a major
disincentive to good work, and thus be more inefficient than the retention of
employees of different political persuasions. See id.
151. See id. at 368 (suggesting that support for the political parties stems from
the patronage system).
152. See id. at 368-69.
153. See id. at 367 (identifying government's position as protecting government
efficiency through political loyalty).
154. See id. (acknowledging that although the government's argument had some
force, it was not enough to justify the practice of patronage).
155. See id. (pointing out that nonpolicymaking employees cannot thwart party
goals).
156. See id. at 367-68 (noting that in determining whether a position is a policy
position, consideration needs to be given to the responsibilities attached to the
position and whether such responsibilities include advising and formulating plans
for implementation).
157. See id. at 367. The Court reasoned that "[nionpolicymaking individuals
usually have only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a position to thwart
the goals of the in-party." Id. The Court was not completely clear on how to
distinguish policymaking from nonpolicymaking positions. See id. Justice Brennan
acknowledged that while "no clear line can be drawn between policymaking and
nonpolicymaking positions," courts should consider the nature of an employee's
responsibilities and whether the same include acting as an adviser or formulating
plans for the implementation of broad goals. See id. at 367-68.
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The Court has followed this categorical approach in later
decisions while expanding the scope of the Elrod decision. For
example, in Branti v. Finkel,' the Court adhered to the
categorical approach, but rejected strict adherence to the
policymaking label as the means of applying the Elrod test.'5 9
Instead, the Court pointed out that the ultimate question is
"whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved." 6 ' In more recent
cases, the Court has expanded First Amendment protection to
include not only politically motivated dismissals, as in Elrod,
but also promotions, transfers, and recalls,'61 and to cover not
only public employees, but also independent contractors. 62
Thus-unlike the approach taken in cases reviewing the
constitutionality of the Hatch Act-in patronage cases, the
Court has been more willing to reject the rationales advanced
by the government in favor of permitting the use of
patronage. 6 ' The different treatment between patronage and
Hatch Act cases is evident not only in the outcome of the cases
(e.g., invalidating patronage, while upholding restrictions on
political activities), but also in the different tests the Court
has applied for each (e.g., the balancing test vis-A-vis the
categorical approach)."6

158. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
159. See id. at 518 (indicating that the inquiry is not whether a position involves
policymaking or has confidential implications, but whether the position requires a
particular party affliation for the effective performance of the public office in

question).
160. Id.
161. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990) (rejecting the
argument that contractual employment status should be considered when
considering First Amendment claims in patronage cases).
162. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 720-21, 726
(1996) (declining to exclude independent contractors from First Amendment
protections).
163. See id. (rejecting the government's attempt to exclude independent
contractors from patronage rules); see also Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72 (refusing to accept
government's rationale that promotions, transfers, and recalls are not a right and
thus not subject to review by the Court).
164. Compare, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976) (applying a
categorical approach to patronage cases by distinguishing between policy and
nonpolicymaking decisions), with United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) (applying a balancing test as the
appropriate standard).
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IV. DISTINCTION WITHoUT A DIFFERENCE

A. Overview
As noted in Parts II and I above, court decisions have been
generally sympathetic to the constitutionality of laws regulating the
political activities of public employees, but have restricted the use of
patronage by local and state governments.'65 The different
treatment afforded these two practices is perplexing, considering
that government has defended both practices based on the need to
achieve efficiency in the delivery of public services and to hold
public employees to the highest possible ethical standards.
The varying approaches the courts have taken represent two
very different models of the dynamics of public employment. The
treatment of challenges to Hatch Act-type laws conceptualizes
the public employer as "guardian" of the public interest, whose
main concern is assuring an efficient, impartial, and fair delivery
of public services.166 We call this the "good government" model.
Cases like Mitchell 6 and Letter Carriers68 are examples of this
model.'69 In contrast, when responding to legal challenges to
patronage, courts have seemingly viewed the public employer
(i.e., government officials) as a party that cannot be trusted and
who will, if permitted, take advantage of his or her position of
authority in order to perpetuate his or her political life. 7 ' We
refer to this as the "partisan politics" model. Cases like Elrod,
Branti, and Rutan are examples of this approach. 7' In this Part,
we discuss these two models more extensively.

165.
Compare, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102-03
(1947) (acknowledging the constitutionality of Hatch Act legislation restricting First
Amendment freedoms), with Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72-75 (rejecting the state's attempts
to retain patronage privileges).
166. See, e.g., Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (recounting the government's argument
that patronage helps guarantee efficient government).
167. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
168. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
169. See Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 564 (sustaining Congress's legislation on
the restriction of public employees' political participation); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 102
(ceding the power to determine whether government employees can be political
party workers to Congress).
170. See, e.g., Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72-75 (contending that patronage restricts
First Amendment freedoms of public employees fearing retribution); Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) (asserting that an assistant public defender's
employment should not be dependent on political affiliation); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 35556 (recognizing the dangers of coercion on public employees that are found in the
practice of patronage).
171. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72-75; Branti, 445 U.S. at 519; Elrod, 427 U.S. at
355-56.
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B. The "Good Government"Model
Several arguments have been advanced in favor of
government's attempt to restrict the political involvement of
public employees via Hatch Act-type laws.'72 In particular, such
laws have been justified as necessary to ensure an efficient and
impartial administration of public services.' Prohibitions on
political activity were expected to provide an equitable
administration of the law and distribution of resources, thus
leading to a more efficient and fair bureaucracy." With regard to
efficiency, the main concern is having public employees perform
partisan political work while at the same time performing official
public duties.'75 As for impartiality, the
76 underlying concern is
with the fair administration of the law.

172. Refer to notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text (summarizing
government's arguments in favor of restricting the political participation of public
employees).
173. Refer to notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text (detailing five
governmental interests advanced for the support of the Hatch Act). Two other
arguments favor restricting political activities by public employees. First, supporters
of restrictions on partisan activities by federal employees contend that elected
politicians could use the government bureaucracy to establish a powerful political
machine. Refer to note 57 supra and accompanying text (citing government's fear of
public service being turned into a powerful political machine as a justification for
restricting the political activity of government employees). Without restrictions on
their political activities, it is possible that a large contingency of government
employees will provide in-kind assistance to political campaigns and, thus, distort
the political process. Refer to note 54 supra and accompanying text (acknowledging
the Court's desire to maintain neutrality in government). While this argument
might have had some merit in an era in which grassroots and in-kind political
contributions were at the core of the political process, concerns about the political
machine are less pressing in an era of mass-media campaigning. See Hasen, supra
note 121, at 1318-19 (suggesting patronage is waning as technology makes it less
politically profitable). Second, restrictions on the political activities of public
employees have also been justified on the grounds that they are necessary to protect
public employees. See Webster & Kasle, supra note 3, at 29 (ascribing a desire to
avoid subjecting public employees to coercion as a motive of the Hatch Act). By
limiting the possibility of a politicized public service, government employees gain
protection from pressure to vote, or otherwise participate in politics in order to curry
favor with superiors. See id. The rationale that prohibitions against political activity
will prevent coercion assumes that an employee, who is asked by a supervisor to
engage in political activities, will be able to decline to avoid violating the law. See id.
This has been referred to as the "I'm Hatched" defense. See id. In light of the
protections provided under "civil service" statutes both at the federal and state
levels, it is unclear what additional protection employees actually receive from
Hatch Act-type laws.
174. See Webster & Kasle, supra note 3, at 30 (noting that prohibitions on
political activity were predicated to bring about an equitable administration of the

law).
175.
176.

See id.
See id. at 31.
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For example, the rationale behind the "merit" system in the
federal civil service (i.e., that federal employees should be hired
according to ability and protected from political abuse), together
with restrictions imposed on public employees' political activities,
177
are believed to ensure impartial administration of the law.
Political administration of the law is discouraged by reassuring
government employees that as long as they perform their duties
in accordance with legislative and agency guidelines, their tenure
in employment is not subject to political manipulation by
superiors. 178 The prohibition against active political participation

is necessary because loyalty to the impartial administration of
the law is likely to succumb to the political interests of politically
active public employees.'9 Thus, to prevent this conflict of
interest, public employees should be isolated from political
pressures.180

Imbedded in the "good government" model is the assumption
that public employees, if given the opportunity, will abuse their
positions by placing partisan politics ahead of the public's
interests."' The Mitchell decision, for example, contains multiple
references to the "evils" created by public employees' involvement
in politics 82 and the menacing aspects of their behavior.183 In
177. See id. (asserting that fair application of the law is one of the underlying
goals of Hatch Act-type legislation).
178. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 566 (1973) (pointing out that one of the goals of enacting Hatch Acttype legislation is to make sure that employees feel free from pressure and can
express their political inclinations without fear of losing their jobs).
179. See Webster & Kasle, supra note 3, at 30-31 (noting that one of the
concerns that prompted the enactment of Hatch Act-type legislation was the belief
that without such legislation, government would be run along party lines).
180. The notion that restricting public employees' political activities contributes
to public confidence in government is seen most clearly in Letter Carriers.In Letter
Carriers,the Court noted that "it is not only important that the Government and its
employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they
appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent." Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at
565. Although the Supreme Court in Letter Carriersdid not explain how prohibiting
public employees' political activities would help strengthen public confidence in
government, the Court expressed concern with the effects that certain political
activities could have on the public, even when the public is not hurt directly by the
actions of the public employee. See id.(recognizing that it is important that the
public perceive an impartial administration if "confidence in the system of
representative government is not to be eroded"). For example, public confidence in
government may be reduced when public officials use their offices for personal gain.
181. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947)
(recognizing the evils associated with political partisanship).
182. "The influence of political activity by government employees, if evil in its
effects on the service, the employees or people dealing with them, is hardly less so
because that activity takes place after hours." Id. at 95. "To declare that the present
supposed evils of political activity are beyond the power of Congress to redress would
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order to control the problem created by this predisposition
attributed to public employees, the "good government" model
turns to the public employer as the solution. The public
employer, represented by the legislature, is expected to control
public employees by enacting laws that limit the ability of public
employees to corrupt the delivery of public services."M Hence, the
enactment of Hatch Act-type laws. Underlying this model, of
course, is the assumption that politically-oriented public
employees are controlled by an "apolitical" public employer.
Consequently, the "good government" model entirely fails to
consider the possibility that the public employer-the
legislature-is itself subject to political pressure and, thus, will
only enact legislation that responds to those pressures.
C. The "PartisanPolitics"Model
While government has successfully raised the efficiency
argument as a rationale for regulating the political activities of
public employees, it has failed to convince the courts to accept the
same argument when reviewing legal challenges to patronage.185
The courts' response to such arguments represents what we refer
to as the "partisan politics" model.
As discussed earlier, defenders of patronage have argued
that it is necessary to insure effective government and the
efficiency of public employees.'8 6 Presumably, employees of
political persuasions different from those of the party controlling
public office will lack the incentive to work efficiently and "may
even be motivated to subvert the incumbent administration's
efforts to govern effectively."'87 An implication of this argument is
that the public employer, who is in charge of implementing
patronage, can be trusted to use it in a way that fosters efficiency
and, thus, is not abusive. The Supreme Court has rejected this
view. 18

leave the nation impotent to deal with what many sincere men believe is a material
threat to the democratic system." Id. at 99.
183. "When actions of civil servants in the judgment of Congress menace the
integrity and the competency of the service, legislation to forestall such danger and
adequate to maintain its usefulness is required." Id. at 103.
184. See id. (requiring Congress to enact legislation to forestall threats to the
integrity of public service).
185. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 364 (1976) (rejecting the
Governmenfs efficiency argument as a justification for patronage).
186. Refer to notes 124-29 supra and accompanying text (identifying historical
justifications for patronage).
187. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364.
188. See id. (finding unpersuasive government's fears of internal subversion).
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Instead, the Court has focused on costs associated with
patronage. 9 The Court's concern with the potential effects of
patronage on the freedoms of belief and association,"' as well as
on the electoral process, weighed more heavily in the majority's
reasoning than the possible benefits derived from the practice.191
This "partisan politics" model recognizes that the public
employer might abuse patronage and, thus, is evidence of a
distrusting view of the public employer. Yet the decisions in
Elrod and its progeny do not impose an absolute ban on
patronage, but allow that certain government positions can be
subject to patronage. In short, the Court acknowledges that the
freedoms of belief and association are not absolute, and that
patronage only presents constitutional problems if it infringes too
far on those liberties.192
Interestingly, the "partisan politics" model of the public
employer is consistent with public choice theory. Public choice
research conceptualizes bureaucrats as self-interested utility
maximizers who seek to advance their power, income, and
prestige by expanding the size of bureaucracy. 93 According to this
view, top-level bureaucrats, left to their own devices, might
pressure public employees to support policies that encourage the
expansion of government.9 Public employees are expected to be
especially vulnerable to such pressures because of their strong
loyalty to the organization controlling their job security.'95
Therefore, there needs to be some outside control, in this case the
judiciary, to monitor the possible abuses likely to result if
politicians are left unattended.
D. Different Models-Same Practice
Identifying the differences between the models used to
evaluate patronage and the regulation of public employees'
189. See id. at 355-56 (noting that the proper inquiry in patronage is identifying
whether the practice of patronage places limitations on constitutional protections).
190. See id. at 355-56 (addressing the limitations that patronage places on an
employee's ability to exercise his First Amendment freedoms).
191. See id. at 355-57, 373 (holding that patronage places too many restrictions
upon public employees' First Amendment freedoms and is thus unconstitutional).
192. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973) (listing at length restrictions Congress could
constitutionally levy).
193. See, e.g., William Niskanen, Comment, Bureaucratsand Politicians,18 J.L.
& ECON. 617, 618 (1975) (formalizing the model of bureaucratic empire building).
194. See, e.g., RONALD WINTROBE, Modern Bureaucratic Theory, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE: A HANDBOOK 451 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
195. See id. (analyzing the reasons an employer has power over his employees in
context of the cost of disobedience, i.e., unemployment).
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political activities raises one very important question: Are the
practices of patronage and the regulation of political activities as
different as the two models suggest? That is, do the "good
government" and "partisan politics" models provide a theory for
distinguishing between the two practices or are the two models a
post hoc justification for what is simply a political choice? A
review of the politics surrounding the passage of Hatch Act
legislation suggests that the latter best explains how these
practices are treated in the law and that both patronage and the
regulation of political activities lead to political manipulation.
V. "UNMASKING" HATCH ACT-TYPE REGULATIONS
A. Overview
The various justifications for prohibiting political activities
by public employees suggest that the motives behind the
regulations are benign, perhaps even noble. That is, regulation of
public employees' political activities combines a paternalistic
concern for the welfare of government employees with the
defense of good government.
So far we have argued that, similar to patronage,
government's efforts to regulate the political activities of
public employees represent a form of political manipulation.
Moreover, we posited that the manner in which the courts
have responded to these forms of regulation, that is, adhering
to the "good government" model, is based on the premise that
the regulation intends to achieve an ideal standard of public
service."' These two approaches provide us with a competing
set of hypotheses. If the good government approach correctly
explains the existence of Hatch Act-type laws, we should
observe no particular trends in the voting behavior of
legislators on proposed Hatch Act legislation. On the other
hand, if political control is the motivating force behind Hatch
Act-type laws, a number of other hypotheses might explain
legislative voting behavior.

196. See William H. Magness, Comment, "Un-Hatching" Federal Employee
PoliticalEndorsements, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1522-23 (1986) (advancing the view
that restrictions on public employees' participation in political activities stemming
from the Hatch Act not only fail to prevent such activities, but provide a means for
public and private officials to distort the democratic process).
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B. Revealed Motives
1. Theoretical Framework. In this Part, we develop a
theoretical framework to explain legislators' voting behavior. We
then empirically test this model. The results are consistent with
the argument developed earlier: Laws restricting political
activities of public employees are not substantively different than
patronage because they basically involve an attempt to control
and manipulate the political process."'
At first glance, voting behavior in Congress might be
attributed to party membership. Examination of congressional
voting patterns on federal Hatch Act legislation clearly shows
that Hatch Act legislation is partisan. For example, the
legislative history surrounding the Hatch Act of 1939 suggests
that the Act was passed largely because Republicans were
concerned with the existence of patronage in federal agencies
created during the New Deal. 9 ' Republicans feared that
President Roosevelt would use the support of federal employees
owing allegiance to him to gain support for his policies.199 These
partisan concerns are reflected in Table 3, which shows that
100% of voting Republicans in the House voted for the Hatch Act
compared to 38.5% of Democrats.00
Similarly, partisan politics were strongly evident during
congressional votes on proposed amendments to weaken Hatch
Act restrictions in 1976, 1990, and 1993.20' The voting records for
these amendments, also presented in Table 3, show that a
substantial majority of Republicans in the House of
Representatives and Senate rejected amendments to weaken
existing Hatch Act prohibitions. 2 In contrast, the amendments
received overwhelming support of House and Senate
20
DemocratsY.
Totaling all votes for the various amendments

indicates that only about 40% of Republicans in the House of
197. See id. (propounding the view that laws regulating public employees'
political activities are themselves a form of political manipulation). Refer to notes
198-200 infra and accompanying text (justifying the argument that legislators'
voting patterns are indicative of partisan voting).
198. See Magness, supra note 196, at 1501-02 (tracing how the Hatch Act of
1939 was largely a product of Republican fears about the effects of patronage on the
new federal agencies created by the New Deal).
199. See id. at 1501.
200. See Table 3 (depicting legislators' partisan voting patterns on the Hatch
Act and all of its amendments from 1939-1990).
201. See id. (illustrating how most Republicans opposed weakening the Hatch
Act).
202. See id.
203. See id.
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Representatives supported Hatch Act reform compared to about
92% of Democrats.2 Even more lopsided results appear in the
Senate, where about 25% of Republicans supported the reform
amendments compared to nearly 96% of Democrats. 5

Table 3:
Congressional Votes 1939 - 1990 Hatch Act and
Amendments'
1939

1976

Yes

No

Yes

No

1976
Veto
Override
Yes No

Rep.

156

0

25

112

22

113

90

84

84

90

90

84

Dem.

85

133

216

52

221

47

244

3

243

3

248

1

Rep.

-

-

5

28

-

-

13

30

10

35

13

30

Dem.

-

-

49

8

-

-

54

0

55

0

55

1

1990

Yes

No

1990
Veto
Override
Yes No

Yes

No

1993

House

Senate

See 1993 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, supra note 76, at 201-03; 1990 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC, supra note 75, at 408, 410; 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC: 94TH CONG. 2ND
SESSION 1976, at 490, 493 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC].

At a basic level, the data in Table 3 support our main
argument. Namely, when enacting laws restricting the political
activities of public employees, legislators respond to some
underlying political motivation as represented by the individual
legislator's party alliance, rather than some abstract concept of
"good government."" 6
This does not mean, however, that party membership is
deterministic of voting behavior. As shown in Table 3, while
votes clearly occurred along party lines on the Hatch Act and
its amendments, in every single vote, a non-trivial number of

204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Magness, supra note 196, at 1501 (canvassing the underlying political
motivations for the enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939); see also Table 3.
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legislators crossed party lines."7 Table 4 presents the total
number of legislators that crossed party lines in each of the
recorded votes. An interesting trend appears. After the initial
vote enacting the Hatch Act, in which no Republican legislator
crossed party lines," 8 there has been, both in absolute and
relative terms, a steady increase in the number of Republicans
voting in favor of liberalizing restrictions on the political
activities of public employees." 9 At the same time, the number
of Democrats crossing party lines has decreased in both houses
of Congress.2 10 The data in Table 4 suggest that the voting
behavior of legislators might be related to specific interests
that transcend any abstract ideas of good government and
even party membership characteristics. So then, what explains
these voting patterns?

Table 4:
Number of Votes Crossing Party Linea
Year

a

House

Senate

Republican Democrat

Republican Democrat

1939

0

84

-

-

1976

25

52

5

8

1976

22

47

-

-

1990

84

3

13

0

1990

90

3

10

0

1993

84

1

13

1

See Table 3.

In order to explain voting patterns surrounding Hatch Act
legislation, one must consider the nature of the legislation and
the vote-maximizing concerns of elected government officials.

207. See Table 3.
208. See Table 4 (demonstrating that no Republican legislator crossed party
lines in the vote on the original Hatch Act).
209. See id. (illustrating the general increase in the number of Republican
legislators voting in favor of decreasing Hatch Act-type restrictions on the political
activities of public employees).
210. See id.
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The Hatch Act and similar types of laws target a very specific
group-public employees.2 1' Thus, the costs associated with
such laws are borne almost exclusively by public employees,
while whatever benefits derived from "good government" are
diffused to a public that remains rationally ignorant of the
laws' effects.212 Because vote-maximizing politicians recognize
the concentrated costs and dispersed benefits associated with
Hatch Act-type laws, they should be responsive to the presence
of public employees in order to maximize their chances for reelection. In short, votes regarding the Hatch Act and its
amendments must relate in some non-trivial way to
characteristics of public employees.
Because public employees are more likely to vote and to
otherwise be more politically active than other citizens, public
employees can represent an important voting block."' If public
employees represent a significant portion of a legislator's
constituency, that legislator should be more likely to support
policies favored by public employees, especially those that
facilitate their participation in the political process.
Accordingly, there should be a positive relationship between
the size of the public labor force and the legislator's tendency
to support liberalization of Hatch Act-type restrictions
independent of party membership.
2. Analysis of Voting Patterns.As is traditionally done in
research applying economic principles to the analysis of
political processes, we assume that the primary objective of
legislators is re-election." 4 In order to maximize their
probability of re-election, politicians act in a manner
consistent with the re-election goal. Accordingly, legislators'
211. See 5 U.S.C. § 7322 (1994); Refer to notes 30-32 supra and accompanying
text (identifying how the Hatch Act and its various amendments limit the political
activities of public employees).
212. See ROBERT D. TOLLISON, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 194,
at 506, 521-22 (propounding the notion of legislation as a market mechanism by
analyzing how members of the more diffuse and disorganized segments of society are
taxed to fund legislation, and by contending that the better organized interest
groups are much more active players in the market of legislation because the
benefits are significantly higher for them).
213. See, e.g., James T. Bennett & William P. Orzechowski, The Voting Behavior
of Bureaucrats: Some Empirical Evidence, 41 PUB. CHOICE 271, 282 (1983)
(evidencing the notion that public employees tend to engage in political activities
more than other citizens).
214. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13 (1975)
(illustrating that the assumption that the primary objective of legislators is reelection is a central one to economic analysis of politics); cf Hasen, supra note 121,
at 1316 (critiquing as simplistic the assumption that a legislator's sole objective is
re-election, but adopting it because it is efficient and ubiquitous).
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voting behavior can be explained by looking at the preferences
of their constituencies.21 5
In addition to party membership and the presence of
federal
employees
in
a legislator's
district,
other
characteristics related to the economic and ideological
preferences of constituents must be included in a model of
legislators' voting behavior.2 16 These variables should
empirically capture the effects of other factors that are likely
to affect the policy preferences of constituents and, thus, the
voting behavior of the individual legislator.
Consistent with arguments presented above and with
prior research on congressional voting behavior, we examine
the influence of the following variables on legislators' votes on
Hatch Act reform
legislation:
PARTY
(0=Democrat,
1=Republican); PERCENT PUBLIC (percentage of the
state/district's labor force that works in government);
INCOME (median family income); PERCENT URBAN
(percentage of the state/district's population living in urban
areas); PERCENT UNION (percentage of the state's labor
force that is unionized); PERCENT BLACK (percentage of the
state/district's population that is black).2" This leads to the
estimation of the following equation:
VOTE = f (PARTY, PERCENT UNION, PERCENT URBAN,
INCOME, PERCENT PUBLIC, PERCENT BLACK),
where VOTE equals 1 if the legislator supported liberalizing
the Hatch Act and 0 otherwise. Because VOTE is a
dichotomous dependent variable, logistic regression was used
in the analyses.

215. See Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and CongressionalVoting, 27 J.L.
& ECON. 181, 183-84 (1984) (justifying the argument that legislators' voting patterns
can be explained by looking at the preferences of their constituencies).
216. See id. (explaining that factors such as race and ideology must be included
as variables in any economic model of legislators' voting patterns for such a model to
be accurate).
217. Data for each variable were collected for years 1976, 1990, and 1993, all
years when Hatch Act reform legislation was voted on by both houses of Congress.
The data sources are the following: VOTE-Congressional Quarterly Almanac,
various years; PERCENT UNION-Statistical Abstract of the United States, various
years; PERCENT URBAN, PERCENT BLACK and INCOME--Statistical Abstract
of the United States and Almanac of American Politics, various years.
218. See ERIC A. HANUSHEK & JOHN E. JACKSON, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 187, 190-91 (1977) (noting that logistic regressions must be used
to tabulate dichotomous dependent variables).
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Although this represents a rather simplistic empirical
model of complex political decision making, it enables us to
more rigorously test whether or not the voting behavior of
legislators on Hatch Act reform legislation was motivated
primarily by partisan politics or whether other factors were at
work. Table 5 shows the regression
results of the various votes
219
on amendments to the Hatch Act.

Table 5
Logistic Regression Analysis of Congressional Voting
(House and Senate) on "Hatch"Act Reform Legislation
(includes votes in 1976, 1990, 1993)
Variable

Coefficient

(S.E.)
2.154
(.667)
-3.488**

Intercept
Party

(.200)
Pct. Union

.028**

(.008)
Pct. Urban

.022**

(.004)
Income
Pct. Black

.00002
(.93E-5)
.005

Pct. Public

(.006)
-.085**

-2 LLR

(.027)
580.540**

N

1349

(*) p<.01 (05)
All tests are two-tail.
**

These results demonstrate that even after controlling for
other factors that might affect votes on Hatch Act legislation,
party membership continues to be a major determinant of
219.

See Table 5.
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voting behavior.2 2 Republicans were significantly less likely
than Democrats to support Hatch Act reform legislation.2 2'
Thus, as originally suspected, party membership is a
significant determinant of voting behavior regarding
amendments to the Hatch Act, which supports our hypothesis
that regulations concerning the political activities of public
employees are a form of political control.2 22
Other significant results are consistent with the
prevailing ideology of the groups the variables tend to
represent. For example, a higher percentage of union members
(who tend to support more liberal legislation) and a higher
percentage of residents in urban areas (where high
concentrations of minorities are found) significantly increased
support for Hatch Act reform legislation.2 "
Interestingly, the percentage of a state's labor force
employed in government is significantly and negatively
associated with support for Hatch Act reform legislation.224
Although consistent with our general hypothesis that
constituents' characteristics matter in explaining voting
behavior, this result is inconsistent with our hypothesis that
the percentage of a state's labor force employed in government
would be positively associated with a liberal vote.22 The
negative PERCENT PUBLIC coefficient in Table 5 suggests
that the larger the percentage of the state's labor force
employed in government, the less likely it is that a legislator
will vote in favor of liberalizing the Hatch Act.22 To further
examine this relationship, we ran a separate analysis for
Democrat and Republican members of Congress. Table 6
presents these results.

220. See id.
221. See id.
222. Refer to note 197 supra and accompanying text (justifying the argument
that laws regulating the political activities of public employees are themselves
political machinations).
223. See Table 5.
224. See id.
225. Refer to text accompanying notes 213-14 supra (reflecting the hypothesis
that the higher the percentage of a state's labor force that is publicly employed, the
more likely it is that the state's legislators will vote to liberalize Hatch Act-type
restrictions).
226. See Table 5 (illustrating that the percentage of a state's labor force
employed in government is inversely proportional to the likelihood of a legislator's
voting in favor of liberalizing Hatch Act restrictions).
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Table 6
Logistic Regression Analysis of Congressional Voting
(House and Senate) on "Hatch"Act Reform Legislation
(includes votes in 1976, 1990, 1993)
(A) Republicans Only
Variable
Intercept
Pct.
Union
Pct.
Urban
Income
Pet. Blac

Coefficient (S.E.)
-.857
(.745)
.030**
(.009)
.016**

(.006)
.40E-5
(.00001)
.008

(.008)
Pet.
Public
-2LLR
N

-.078*
(.031)
43.018**
525
(*) p<.O1 (05)
M
1 tests are two-tail.

(B) Democr ats Only
Variable
Intercept

Coefficient (S.E.)
.232
(1.338)
Pet.
.022
Union
(.018)
Pct.
.022**
Urban
(.007)
Income
.00014**
(.00004)
Pct. Black .002
(.010)
Pct.
-.060
Public
(.054)
-2LLR
75.089**
N
824
** (*) p<.01 (05)
All tests are two tail.
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The results in Table 6 suggest that the negative PERCENT
PUBLIC coefficient is primarily driven by the effect it has on the
voting behavior of Republicans. Compare the negative and
significant PERCENT PUBLIC coefficient in panel (a) with the
positive and statistically insignificant coefficient in panel (b).
That is, Republicans are less likely to vote in favor of liberalizing
the Hatch Act when they face a larger public sector in their
states.227 A plausible explanation for this result could be related
to the public employment policies that the two political parties
have traditionally supported.
Republicans have generally favored policies calling for a
smaller government bureaucracy.2 28 In contrast, the Democratic
Party has traditionally been associated with "expansionist"
government policies. 22 9' As bureaucrats, public employees tend to
favor policies that expand the government bureaucracy. 20 By
increasing the size of government budgets, public employees
maximize their own job security. Accordingly, public employees
should be more likely to support Democrats than Republicans.
Recognizing this, a Republican legislator might reasonably
calculate that there is little chance of gaining political support
from public employees and, thus, vote to create obstacles to their
participation in the political process.
In sum, these findings make it difficult to conclude that
partisan politics are not a driving force behind debates regarding
the appropriateness of government regulation of public
employees' political activities. Of course, these sorts of political
debates are not new. The same partisan self-interests are
reflected in battles over whether or not government should adopt
policies that increase voter turnout, such as voter-friendly
registration, voting on the weekend, and easy access to absentee
ballots, among others."' At the core of these debates is the simple
227. See Table 6 (detailing how the size of the public sector in a state is
inversely proportional to the likelihood of Republicans' voting in favor of liberalizing
the Hatch Act).
228. See, e.g., Anita Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal
Constitution: The Anatomy of the 1995-96 Budget "Train Wreck," 34 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 589, 602 (1997) (reviewing congressional Republicans' 1995 goal of
consolidating the federal bureaucracy and downsizing the federal government).
229. See Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Politics and the Constitution:A
Review of Judge Malcolm Wilkey's Call for a Second ConstitutionalConvention, 27
PAC. L.J. 1213, 1229-30 (1996) (book review) (highlighting the difference between
social and political progressivism and conservatism as well as the Democratic
Party's traditional allegiance to the progressive movement).
230. Refer to notes 193-94 supra and accompanying text (describing how the
federal bureaucracy seeks to enlarge itself).
231. See Arend Lijphart, Compulsory Voting is the Best Way to Keep Democracy
Strong, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 18, 1996, at B3.
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fact that low voter turnout favors privileged voters, who tend to

be conservative, and thus benefits the Republican Party."
VI. RELATIONSHIP TO UNIONIZATION
For much of the nation's history, unionization and collective
bargaining by government employees were considered
inappropriate by lawmakers and also by union officials." In fact,
public employees were excluded from labor legislation coverage
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act" 4 and the National Labor
Relations Act"' passed during the New Deal era." Consequently,
public employees lacked protection to unionize and engage in
collective bargaining at a time when private sector unions
flourished. In the early 1960s, this situation began to change
when President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988,2 7 which
granted limited unionization and collective bargaining rights for
federal employees," 8 and various states began passing public
sector labor legislation. 9
Today, approximately eight million government employees
are covered under collective bargaining agreements." Public
sector union members constitute approximately 38% of all
union members in the United States. 241' Although extremely
important to the growth of public sector unionization after
1960, the passage of legislation supporting unionization and
collective bargaining was not the lone cause.2 42 At the time
these laws were passed, public employees' attitudes toward
collective bargaining were changing, unions were intensifying
their organizing efforts in the public sector, and, where

232.
233.

See id. at B4.
See John F. Burton, Jr. & Terry Thomason, The Extent of Collective

Bargainingin the Public Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 14-15 (Benjamin
Aaron et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990) (canvassing the historical trend of union officials and

legislators to discourage collective bargaining by public employees).
234.

29 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).

235.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).

236. See id. § 102 (asserting the applicability of the statutory provisions to the
rights of owners of property to unionize); id. § 152(2) (denying coverage under the
statute to public employees).
237. 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
238. See id. § 1(a)-(b).
239. See Burton & Thomason, supra note 233, at 17.
240. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMT., STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1997, 440 tbl. 688 (117th ed. 1997).
241. See id.
242. See Burton & Thomason, supra note 233, at 27 (pointing out that part of
the growth in public sector unionization was due, in part, tothe changed attitude of
workers toward bargaining).
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organizing occurred, management resistance was minimal.24 3
Considering the interrelationships among these various
factors, it seems reasonable to conclude that the initiating
factor was changes in public employees' attitudes. For
example, unions would not likely have targeted public
employees for organizing drives if public employees were not
interested in unions and collective bargaining. Similarly,
collective bargaining legislation, which some have argued has
been the most important determinant of public sector union
growth,2 " would not have existed without demand for such
legislation by public employees.2 45
The development of public sector unionization provides an
interesting contrast to the development of laws regulating the
political activities of public sector employees. While the federal
and state governments were limiting political involvement by
public employees, those same employees were pursuing
collective activities as a way of increasing their voice in the
political sphere. 46 Given these two parallel developments, one
wonders whether the increase in unionization among public
employees might have been at least partially caused by
restrictions placed on public employees by Hatch Act-type
legislation.247
243. See id. at 17, 27.
244. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & CASEY ICHNIOWSKI, Introduction: The Public
Sector Look ofAmerican Unionism, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE 1,
2-3 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988) (contending that collective
bargaining legislation is the most important factor in causing public sector growth).
245. The idea that state bargaining laws are endogenously determined can be
found in Melissa Waters & William J. Moore, The Theory of Economic Regulation
and Public Choice and the Determinants of Public Sector BargainingLegislation,
PUB. CHOICE, Aug. 1990, at 161, 161 (suggesting that state bargaining laws ought to
be regarded as endogenously determined).
246. See Project:Collective Bargainingand Politics in PublicEmployment, supra
note 37, at 983-84 (discussing the relationship between collective bargaining
legislation in the public sector and the regulation of political activities by individual
employees); Dale Belman et al., Public Sector Employment Relations in Transition,
in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 1, 2 (Dale Belman et al.
eds., 1996) (describing the 1960s through the 1980s as the era of establishment and
maturation of collective bargaining in the public sector).
247. Arguably, if the primary intent of restricting the ability of public employees
to engage in political activities is to manipulate the political process, passage of
Hatch Act-type legislation may have been a direct response to the substantial
political power and extensive political participation of public employee unions. While
logically plausible, there are several reasons to reject this causal explanation. First
is the issue of timing. Hatch Act legislation, which was first passed in 1939,
significantly pre-dates the dramatic growth in public employee unionism that
occurred after 1960. Refer to text accompanying notes 29-30 supra (discussing the
enactment of the Hatch Act in 1939). Refer to notes 237-41 supra and accompanying
text (stating that union activity flourished during the 1960s). Second, the political
power of public employee unions makes it highly unlikely that vote-maximizing
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Employees have two means of expressing discontent with the
employment relationship: (1) they can exit the organization; or (2)
to management. 248
they can voice their dissatisfaction
Unfortunately, constraints (i.e., a strong profit motive) generally
associated with public monopolies limit the importance of exit as a
means of changing government. Specifically, because employee exit
is thought to induce change by incurring costs on organizations, the
lack of a profit motive diminishes the potential influence of exit on
public sector organizations' practices and policies.249 This should
effectively increase the importance of voice to government
employees.2 5 Accordingly, public employees might attempt to exert
political influence through their individual participation in various
political activities. Yet, as seen from our review of Hatch Act
legislation, such attempts are often severely constrained by federal
and state Hatch Act legislation.251 The resulting pent-up demand for
political participation will cause public employees to seek
alternative avenues of participation. If public employee unions are
capable of providing political benefits to public employees, demand
for unionization should increase. So, are public employee unions
politically motivated? The answer is clearly "yes."2
Unlike private sector labor-management relations, in
which unions negotiate with decisionmakers concerned with
profit maximization, public sector unions negotiate with
decisionmakers who are vote-maximizers, thus making
collective bargaining inherently political."3 Indeed, early
students of public sector unionization feared that the political
politicians would attempt to limit union power through the passage of Hatch Act
legislation. Finally, though restrictive of political activities by individual public
employees, Hatch Act legislation generally allows public employee political
participation through public employee unions. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1994). This
exception would not be allowed if limiting public employee unions' political power
was the goal of Hatch Act legislation. A more likely explanation for the relationship
between Hatch Act legislation and public employee unionization is that such
legislation was a cause, not an effect, of public employee union growth.
248. Under this view, exit is the classic market (i.e., economic) mechanism,
whereas voice is political. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCOMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 15 (1970).

249. See id. at 34 (illustrating the limited utility of exit as a means of changing
government).
250. See id. (noting that as the opportunities for exit decline, the role of voice
increases).
251. Refer to Part I.A-B supra (detailing the prohibitions against political
involvement imposed on public employees through Hatch Act-type legislation at the
state and federal level).
252. See Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Protective Service Unions' Political
Activities and DepartmentalExpenditures, 16 J. LAB. RES. 171, 171 (1995) (pointing
out that politics and public sector labor activities are intertwined).
253. See id.
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nature of public sector labor-management relations would give
public employee unions inordinate power and thereby distort
the normal political process.254
Recent evidence suggests that public employee unions'
political influence may be increasing and that such influence
yields benefits to public sector union members. For instance, a
recent assessment of union political capital found that public
sector union PAC receipts were 320% higher in 1994 than in
1980 and that per-member PAC receipts were nearly 3.5 times
greater in 1994 than in 1980.255
Obviously, PACs do not represent the full range of union
political activities. This is especially true in the case of public
sector unions in which political pressure tactics are employed to
directly influence collective bargaining outcomes." G Recent
empirical studies have examined the impact that various political
activities at the local level have had on collective bargaining
outcomes, including candidate endorsements, financial and
manpower campaign contributions, mismanagement disclosure
threats, and publicity campaigns, among others. 7 These studies
find that union political activities increase wages and
employment for public sector union members."s Moreover, public
sector unions' political activities increase departmental
expenditures."s Yet union political activities do not increase
municipal expenditures, suggesting that public employee unions
might, in fact, distort the normal political process (i.e., normal
being that which would exist in the absence of unions) by
redistributing resources away from nonunion employees and
toward unionized employees.
254. See HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND
THE CITIES 25 (1971) (arguing that delegating the right to withhold labor and
employ political pressure to public sector unions would grant them an inordinate
share of political power). There are two principle reasons for this belief. First,
monopoly conditions surrounding the provision of many public services ensure a lack
of market forces, which constrain union power in the private sector. Second,
combining the ability to strike with the usual methods of political influence could
give unions "a disproportionate share of effective power in the process of decision[s]."
Id.
255. See MARICK F. MASTERS, UNIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: STRATEGIC
MEMBERSHIP, FINANCIAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 129 (1997).
256. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 254, at 24-25 (asserting that public
sector unions' use of political pressure tactics could skew the political process).
257. See Timothy D. Chandler & Rafael Gely, Protective Service Unions,
PoliticalActivities, and BargainingOutcomes, 5 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 295,
295-96 (1995); see also Kevin M. O'Brien, Compensation, Employment, and the
Political Activity of Public Employee Unions, 13 J. LAB. RES. 189, 190 (1992)
(surveying the effects of public sector unions' political activities).
258. See O'Brien, supra note 257, at 199.
259. See Chandler & Gely, supra note 257, at 295-96.
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In short, public employee unions are actively involved in
political activities to affect collective bargaining outcomes and
governmental resource allocation decisions. 2 " Thus, they provide
valuable political services to public employees who are
constrained from participating in political processes on an
individual basis.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is not uncommon, and probably not surprising, that in a
large democratic system such as ours, there exist some
inconsistencies in the implementation of public policy. This
Article points out one such inconsistency: The differing
treatment that the United States Supreme Court has given to
regulations concerning the political behavior of public
employees, that is, Hatch Act-type laws and patronage.
The Court has been unsympathetic to government's
defense of patronage.2 6' The Supreme Court has essentially
prohibited adverse employment decisions based on political
affiliation, subject to a narrow set of exceptions.2 62 In contrast,
the Court has taken a much more pro-employer approach with
regard to the regulation of public employees' political
activities, often upholding government restrictions on public
employees' political activities.2 63 This Article posits that the
Court's differential treatment of patronage compared to
restrictions on public employees' political activities is
unwarranted. When governments implement restrictive Hatch
Act-type legislation, they are controlling the ability of public
employees to be politically involved to a similar degree as
would occur if they were conditioning public employment on
prospective employees' political affiliations.
If our conclusion is correct, the regulation of political
activities via Hatch Act legislation manipulates political
processes as much as political patronage. Thus, the different
treatment the Court has afforded these areas of public
employment law appears to be unwarranted. The Court, we
submit, should be more willing to question government efforts
260. See Gely & Chandler, supra note 252, at 171 (advancing the notion that
public sector unions affect collective bargaining outcomes).
261. Refer to Part I.B supra (chronicling the cases that evidence the Supreme
Court's distaste for the system of patronage).
262. See id. (chronicling the cases that reflect the Supreme Court's proscription
against employers' firing or demoting employees based solely on the employee's
political predilections).
263. Refer to Part H.A.2 supra (reviewing the Supreme Court's more lenient
stance towards regulations restricting purely political activities).
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to limit political participation by public employees than has
historically been the case, thereby diluting the legal
importance of cases like Mitchell and Letter Carriers.

HeinOnline -- 37 Hous. L. Rev. 822 2000

